News
01 SEP - FAA approves plan for Southwest Airlines to replace unapproved parts 03 SEP - EASA issues new emergency AD on BAe 146/Avro RJ NLG inspections
05 SEP - American Airlines, FAA dispute over alleged improper repairs continues
09 SEP - TSB Canada: Pilots need more training on bounced landings
14 SEP - AAIB: final report on BAe-146 landing incident
18 SEP - PNG AIC releases interim report on Twin Otter CFIT accident near Kokoda
22 SEP - EASA issues emergency AD on A330/A340 pitot probe issues
01 SEP 2009 FAA approves plan for Southwest Airlines to replace unapproved parts [to table of contents]
The U.S. FAA approved a plan that would require Southwest Airlines to replace unapproved parts installed on about 50 Boeing 737 airplanes and for these aircraft to undergo inspections until fixes are made. The airline already has replaced parts on 30 other planes.
An FAA technical review has determined that the unapproved part would not prevent safe operation of the airplanes. The aircraft manufacturer has made a similar determination. As a result, the FAA has determined that the airline may continue to operate aircraft with the unapproved part until the parts can be replaced, on the condition that each plane must be physically inspected for wear and tear every seven days and the affected parts must all be replaced with an approved part by December 24, 2009.
The FAA has also directed Southwest Airlines to locate and dispose of any other unapproved parts made by the same vendor and to report on the results of its aircraft inspections to the FAA on a daily basis.
The unapproved parts are associated with the hinge fittings for the exhaust gate assembly, which help protect the aircraft flaps from engine heat. The FAA determined on August 21 that the parts had been installed on a number of Southwest Airlines planes. The FAA has opened an investigation into this issue.
(FAA)
Press Release
As part of a recent accident investigation (RJ100 NLG failure on landing, February 13, 2009), the examination of a fractured NLG main fitting showed that Messier-Dowty SB.146-32-150 had not been accomplished, although the records indicated that it had been BAE Systems has determined that more NLG units could be similarly affected. These NLG units have been overhauled at Messier Services in Sterling, Virginia, in the United States. This condition, if not corrected, could result in NLG failure. To address this situation, EASA issued Emergency AD 2009-0043-E to require repetitive NDT inspections of each affected NLG unit and, if cracks are found, replacement with a serviceable unit, in accordance with the instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Alert Inspection Service Bulletin ISB.A32-180 and Messier-Dowty (M-D) SB 146-32-149. Subsequently, investigation and analysis by M-D has identified the need for a reduction of the inspection threshold and the repetitive inspection interval for the affected NLG units and has replaced M-D SB 146-32-149 with M-D SB 146-32-174. Consequently, BAE Systems SB 32-158 has been withdrawn and superseded by BAE Systems Alert ISB.A32-180 Revision 1. (EASA)
EASA AD No : 2009-0197-E
05 SEP 2009 American Airlines, FAA dispute over alleged improper repairs continues [to table of contents] The Wall Street Journal reports about an escalating dispute between American Airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) over allegedly improper repairs. According to preliminary findings at least 16 McDonnell Douglas MD-80 aircraft were operated for months, and sometimes years, with potentially substandard repairs to cracks around rear pressure bulkheads. Some FAA inspectors think the circumstances under which the airline suddenly chose to ferry one MD-80 for storage show the move was part of an effort to hide the extent of suspected defects. American Airlines said that facts were being misrepresented by the FAA and that the FAA had complete access to retired aircraft. The aircraft involved in the storage issue was reported being N279AA, an MD-82 (msn 49295/1214) that was delivered to American Airlines in 1985. An ASN query of the FAA's Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR) database shows one report related to pressure bulkhead (JASC code 5312) repair of N279AA in 1999: "TUL - FOUND CORROSION AROUND SEVERAL FASTENERS ON FORWARD SIDE OF STATION 1338 PRESSURE BULKHEAD RIGHT SIDE ABOVE VAULT DOOR JAMB, JUST BELOW RIGHT A/C DUCT. REMOVED DAMAGE BY BLENDING. INSTALLED DOUBLER PER ESO 80559, DATED 12-10-99" (Wall Street Journal)
Wall Street Journal article
09 SEP 2009 TSB Canada: Pilots need more training on bounced landings [to table of contents] Many flight crews do not receive training to deal effectively with bounced landings says the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB). On July 22, 2008, at Hamilton Airport a Boeing 727 touched down hard and bounced before touching down hard a second time. Immediately after the second touchdown, the pilot decided to perform a go-around. During this manoeuvre, the tail contacted the runway. The aircraft climbed away and returned for a normal landing. There were no injuries and only minor damage to the aircraft. In its investigation, the TSB found that while the aircraft manufacturer's manual contained guidance on what to do if the plane bounced on landing, the pilots had never practiced this manoeuvre or received training to safely control and land a plane under these circumstances. In light of this problem, the TSB is calling for operators to train crews on this manoeuvre and make it part of their training program. The Board is recommending that the Canadian Department of Transport require air carriers to incorporate bounced landing recovery techniques in their manuals and during their training activities. (TSB)
TSB Report A08O0189
14 SEP 2009 AAIB: final report on BAe-146 landing incident [to table of contents] BAe 146 EI-CZO burst all four main landing gear tyres during the landing. The aircraft had overrun the landing distance available (LDA), but remained on the paved surface. The flight crew reported a total failure of the aircraft’s brakes. It was a.o. concluded that the incorrect determination of the approach reference speed (VREF) as 119 kt, resulted in the aircraft landing faster than was necessary. The data suggested that the control columns may have been positioned forward of their customary position after touchdown, which could have contributed to a reduction of the aircraft' s weight applied to the main wheels during the first part of the landing roll. The lift spoilers did not deploy, which prevented a timely transfer of the aircraft's weight from the wing to the main wheels, and hence the effectiveness of the wheel brakes during the early part of the landing roll was not maximised. The commander's perception of brake system failure led him to select the emergency braking system which removed the anti-skid protection. (AAIB)
AAIB Report 5/2009
18 SEP 2009 PNG AIC releases interim report on Twin Otter CFIT accident near Kokoda [to table of contents] The Papua New Guinea Accident Investigation Commission (AIC) has released its Preliminary Factual Report into the collision with terrain that occurred near Kokoda, Papua New Guinea on 11 August 2009, involving a de Havilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter aircraft. The airplane flew into the side of a tree covered mountain at an altitude of 5774 feet (1760 metres) during the descent towards Kokoda. (PNG AIC)
interim report
22 SEP 2009 EASA issues emergency AD on A330/A340 pitot probe issues [to table of contents] EASA issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) regarding Airbus A330 and A340 models fitted with specific Goodrich pitot probes. Several reports have recently been received of loose pneumatic quickdisconnect unions on Goodrich pitot probes P/N 0851HL. These may be the result of mis-torque of the affected unions at equipment manufacturing level. Investigations are still on-going to determine the root cause(s). This condition, if not corrected, could lead to an air leak, resulting in incorrect total pressure measurement and consequent erroneous Calibrated Airspeed (CAS)/MACH parameters delivered by the Air Data Computer (ADC). As a precautionary measure, this AD requires a torque check of the pneumatic quick-disconnect union on certain Goodrich P/N 0851HL pitot probes and corrective action, depending on findings. (EASA)
EASA AD No.: 2009-0202-E
